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IN THE SUPREME COURT

of the
STATE OF UTAH

JAMES H. BECKSTROM,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs.

Case No.
8027

PAUL WILLIAMS,
Defendant and Resp,ondent.

BRIEF OF DEFENDANT AND RES.PONDENT
STATEMENT OF THE CAS.E
This action was commenced by plaintiff and appellant against defendant and respondent for personal
injury and property damage as a result of a collision
between a tractor operated by plaintiff and a Chevrolet
1% ton truck driven by defendant. The collision occurred
August 3, 1951, about 4:30 p.m. on Utah Highway 228,
near Benjamin, Utah. The defendant Williams counterclaimed against plaintiff for property damage and personal injury. The jury returned a verdict in favor of
the defendant, no cause of action, on the complaint, and in
favor of the plaintiff, no cause on action, on the counterSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

elaim of defendant.· Plaintiff appeals from the jury
verdict, no cause of action, on the complaint. Plaintiff
and appellant raises three points on his appeal; one
point on the failure of the court to instruct the jury on
the thPory of last clear chance; one point on the failure
of the eourt to give one of plaintiff's requested instructions <·orwPrning the duty of an operator of a vehicle
.-ntPring- a highway from a private driveway; and one
point on the court's ruling on a question propounded to
a witnt>:-;s by plaintiff's counsel regarding a statement
allegedly made after the accident by plaintiff to the
witness.
STATEl\fENT OF FACT
August 3, 1951, plaintiff and appellant was driving
a John Deere Tractor with a side rake attached from the
yard of his brother, Arch Beckstrom, and drove from a
private driveway west of Highway Utah 115, out onto
the highway and the tractor was struck by a Chevrolet
1lh ton truck being driven south along the highway by
the defendant and respondent, Paul Williams. Utah
Highway 228 runs in a north-south direction and joins
Utah Highways 115 and 147 near Benjamin, Utah
County, Utah (R. 119). The driveway from where appellant drove extends from the highway into the yard of
the Arch Beckstrom home. Utah Highway 228 is a 2-lane
oiled highway, the traveled portion of the highway being
20 to 21 feet in width (R. 28-63), and there being
shoulders 2 to 3 feet wide on each side of the oiled portion of the road. The tractor driven by plaintiff and
appellant was 11lh feet in length and the side rake,
2
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including the tow bar, had a length of 17 feet, 8 inches
(H. 100). There was no other traffic on the roadway at
the time of the collision (R. 63). Plaintiff and appellant
was leaving the yard at the Arch Beckstrom home, and
was going to turn left to proceed north 'along the highway (R. 70). There was no posted speed limit on the
highway, and Willian1s was traveling south at a speed
of -!5 to 50 miles per hour (R. 51-52).
The collision that occurred was in the center of the
right half of the highway, the lane for southbound traffic (R. 120, 124, 126).
There was a heavy growth of weeds, trees and
bushes along the fence line to the west side of the highway and on the west shoulder of the road north of the
Beckstrom driveway (R. 28, 47).
Plaintiff and appellant drove the tractor with side
rake behind, from the driveway and as he approached
the highway, had difficulty in observing the traffic coming froPfl the north and had to lean forward to observe
for sue:hJraffic (R.. 50). Plaintiff Beckstrom had stopped
the tractor in the yard before crossing the culvert that
crossed a ditch west of the highway, but he never again
stopped the tractor until the tractor was out onto the
highway (R. 71). As the front wheels of the tractor were
almost to the west side of the traveled portion of the
highway, plaintiff by leaning forward, looked to the
north and saw the truck driven by defendant Williams
approaching at an estimated speed of 45 to 50 1niles per
hour, and at an estimated distance of 300 to 325 feet
north of the tractor. Plaintiff and appellant then endea3
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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vored to ~top the tractor by manipulation of the gears
and foot brake, and was able to stop the tractor when
tlw front wheels reached a position estirnated as 5 feet
WP::-;t of tl1<' center of the highway (R. 75, 76). At the
t iHIP t II(• t rador eame to a stop, the Chevrolet truck of
d<'l'l•ndant and respondent was estirnated by plaintiff to
be 125 feet north of the tractor. It took plaintiff several
sel'ond~ to stop the tractor. After stopping, plaintiff did
nothing to get out of the way or to leave the tractor (R.
;>~). Defendant and respondent testified that he first
saw the tractor as it proceeded east and was 2 or 3 feet
west of the west edge of the oiled portion of the highway,
and that he was at that time 65 feet north of the tractor
(R. 135, 150, 151, 158). Defendant's measurement as to
the distance was made after the accident, measurement
made frmn the point of impact to the place where he was
on the highway when he observed the tractor approaching the highway. Defendant, seeing the tractor come
from behind the bushes and weeds and approaching the
highway attempted to apply his brakes, felt them take
hold, but was unable to avoid a collision with the tractor,
striking the tractor between the front and rear wheels
( R. 151, 159). After the impact, the tractor was carried
south along the highway, the car swerving slightly to the
west as it came to a stop (R. 152, 131). The impact between the truck and tractor was in the center of the lane
of traffic for southbound vehicles (R. 120, 126). It had
just started to sprinkle slightly when the collision
occurred and after the collision, it rained hard for about
a half hour (R. 66, 153, 63).
4
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Plaintiff and appellant fell frozn the traetor in the
collision and was taken to the Payson City Hospital.
While plaintiff was in the Payson City Hospital, he was
questioned by the investigating highway patrolman,
Trooper Owen Beardall of Springville, Utah. Officer
Beardall questioned plaintiff at the hospital concerning
the accident. and Beckstrom told the officer that he was
looking back to see that the hay rake missed the bridge,
and that he never saw the Williams truck. Beckstrom
denied at the trial that he told Beardall that he was
looking back and that he said he never saw the vVilliams
truck ( R. 122, 123).
Exhibits A, B & C are pictures of the scene of the
accident. Exhibit A being a photograph taken from a
point north of the driveway into the Arch Beckstrom
yard, showing the trees, weeds and telephone pole along
the west side of the highway to the north of the Beckstrom driveway. The driveway from where the tractor
approached is indicated by the automobile shown in the
picture, the automobile being upon the culvert, that is,
west of the highway and over which the hay rake was
passing at the time of the collision. On Exhibit A, indicated by an X is the point of impact between the truck
and trackor. Exhibit B is a photograph taken from the
north side of the driveway, looking north along Highway
228. Exhibit C is a photograph taken south of the driveway, looking north past the driveway along Highway
228. Exhibit D is a photograph taken from a point of
the highway where plaintiff claims defendant's truck
was at the time it was first observed by him; the exhibit

5
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also shows a tractor which is claimed to be in the position
of plaintiff's tractor when plaintiff was first able to see
defendant's truck. Exhibit D does not represent the
conditions existing at the time of the accident and does
not show the obstructions to visibility that existed at
the time.
STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT ONE
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN FAILING TO
SUBMIT THE CASE TO THE JURY UPON THE THEORY
OF LAST CLEAR CHANCE.
(A) UNDER THE EVIDENCE THE COURT WAS CORRECT IN REFUSING TO SUBMIT THE CASE TO THE JURY
UPON THE THEORY OF LAST CLEAR CHANCE AS SET
FORTH IN SECTION 480 OF THE RESTATEMENT OF
TORTS.
(B) UNDER THE EVIDENCE OF THE CASE THE
TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY REFUSED TO SUBMIT THE
CASE TO THE JURY UPON THE LAST CLEAR CHANCE
DOCTRINE AS SET FORTH IN SECTION 479 OF THE RESTATEMENT OF TORTS.

POINT TWO
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN FAILING AND
REFUSING TO GIVE PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTION 11, THE COURT HAVING GIVEN SUBSTANTIALLY
THE REQUESTED INSTRUCTION IN ITS INSTRUCTIONS
3, 4 AND 12.

POINT THREE
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY SUSTAINED DEFENDANT'S OBJECTION TO PLAINTIFF'S QUESTION TO
THE WITNESS TANNER TO STATE WHAT PLAINTIFF
TOLD TANNER IN THE PAYSON HOSPITAL AS TO HOW
THE ACCIDENT OCCURRED, SUCH QUESTION CALLING

6
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F'uR A SELF SEHVlNU S'l'A'l'BMEN'l' MADE HY PLAINTIFF AND BEING HEARSAY EVIDENCE AS TO THE
FACTS OF THE OCCURRENCE OF THE ACCIDENT.

ARGUMENT
POINT ONE
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN FAILING TO
SUBMIT THE CASE TO THE JURY UPON THE THEORY
OF LAST CLEAR CHANCE.

Respondent recognizes that this court on many
occasions has recognized the last clear chance doctrine
as set forth in the Restatement of Torts, Section 479 and
480. The court has affirmed the doctrine as set forth in
these sections in the cases of ANDERSON V. BINGHAM
& GARFIELD RAILWAY CO., Utah 214 P 2d 607,
CO~IPTO~ V. OGDEN UNION RY. & DEPOT CO.,
Ftah 235 Pac. 2d 515, :MOREY V. ROGERS, Utah 252
Pac. 2d 231, COX V. THOMPSON, Utah, 254 Pac. 2d
1047, :MINGUS V. OLSEN, 114 Utah 505, 201 Pac. 2d
-!95, GRAHA~:f V. JOHNSON, 109 Utah 365, 172 Pac.
2d 665.
(A) UNDER THE EVIDENCE THE COURT WAS CORRECT IN REFUSING TO SUBMIT THE CASE TO THE JURY
UPON THE THEORY OF LAST CLEAR CHANGE AS SET
FORTH IN SECTION 480 OF THE RESTATEMENT OF
TORTS.

Section 480 of the Restatement of Torts provides:
"A plaintiff, who, by the exercise of reason'"
able vigilance could have observed the danger
created by the defendant's negligence in time to
have avoided harm therefrom may if, but only if,
the defendant
(a) Knew of the plaintiff's situation, and
(b) Realized or had reason to realize that

7
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the plaintiff was inattentive a·rid, tl1~n~~
fore, unlikely to discover his peril in time
to avoid the harni, and,
((') rrhereafter is negligent in failing to utilize with reasonable care and competence
his then existing ability to avoid harming
the plaintiff."
Under the facts of the case now before this· court,
the defendant did not see tractor of plaintiff until defendant was within 65 feet of the place where the acciaerit occurred. At that time, the defendant observed
p~aintiff's tractor approaching the hard surfacedportion
of the highway, moving east, and the def~ndant being then
65 feet north of the tractor, and moving at a speed estimated from 40 to 60 miles per hour, immediately
attempted to apply brakes, but was unable to stop before
,the impact. Can it be reasonably said, after observillg
the tractor but 65 feet in front of him, and at the speed
at which plaintiff was traveling-40 to 60 miles per hour
~that defendant was negligent in failing to utilize with
I'~ason~ble care and comp~te~ce his then existing ability
to avoid harming plaintiff~
Plaintiff was only 65 feet away wh~n d.efend.~D.t
knew plaintiff intended to cross the highway, that is, that
plaintiff was approaching the highway, and at a slow
nl:te of speed, 1 to 1¥2 miles per hour. Can .it be said
~~~~onably that def~ndant at the time he was this short
distan~e away when he observed the tractor. moving
slowly and approaching the highway should have reasonably known ·of the plaintiff's situation and realized or
had reaso·n to realize that plaintiff was· inattentive and,

8
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therefore, unlikely to di~wover hi8 peril in time to avoid
hann f Defendant, traveling along a highway and seeing
a tractor moving very slowly toward the highway, 1 to
1'l~ miles per hour, cannot be said to have known of the
plaintiff's inability to stop the tractor before entering
the highway, cannot be charged with knowing that plaintiff was not going to stop before entering onto the highway and with knowing that plaintiff WdS inattentive and
unlikely to discover his peril, i.e., the approach of a
rapidly moving autonwbile along the highway. The court
having instructed the jury that the prima facie speed
li~it was 60 miles per hour, and there being no clailn that
this instruction was erroneous, it 1nust be assumed that
the prilna facie speed limit was 60 1niles per hour.
In1mediately upon seeing the plaintiff's tractor,
defendant then attempted to stop by application of
brakes. It is claimed that, if plaintiff had turned to the
right, he could have avoided the accident, and that there
was negligence in attempting to stop rather than turning to the right to the left side of the. highway. Defendant testified that the tractor was moving toward the east
half of the highway and in the very short time he had
to act, he applied brakes. Defendant is not charged with
negligence in failing to take the better of avenues of
escape afforded him, he is only charged with taking
reasonable care some avenue to avoid the harm.
In the case of FRENCH V. UTAH OIL REFINING
COMPANY, Utah, 216 Pac. 2d 1002, the court held
that where the shortness of time afforded defendant
did not offer him an opportunity to make ari exact esti-
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mate of the proper direction to turn to a void a collision,
that the last clear chance doctrine was not applicable,
and further that it was not negligence for the driver of
the truck to have turned rather than proceed forward.
MORRJ~ON V. PERRY, 104 Utah 139, 151, 140 Pac. 2d
772, also held that it was not negligence for a driver to
take one of two courses when an emergency confronted
him, even though the cour:-~e taken was wrong, and resulted in an aeeident. At JO miles per hour, defendant was
traveling at the rate of 58.4 feet per second, and at 4.5
miles per hour he was traveling 65.7 feet per second,;
therefore, even at the lower of the speed estimates,
defendant had less than llh seconds to act to avoid the
acident.
Defendant did not know plaintiff would drive across
the highway or realize that plaintiff was inattentive until
plaintiff did so. After realizing the situation, defendant
then did utilize with reasonable care and competence his
then existing ability to avoid harming the plaintiff.
The antecedent negligence of defendant, if any, was
in failing to have observed the tractor operated by plaintiff before it reached a point two or three feet from the
west edge of the highway. He then assumed or had the
right to assume that plaintiff would stop before crossing
the hard surfaced portion of the highway. Furtherfore,
antecedent negligence on part of defendant is not sufficient to charge him with liability under the Section 480
of Restatement of Torts. In the case of ANDERSON
V. BINGHAM & GARFIELD RAILWAY CO., Utah,
214 Pac. 2d 607, this court in stating that antecedent

10
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

neglig·ence i~ not ~ufficient to make the defendant liable
to the negligent plaintiff, and in analyzing the Section
480 of the R.estate1nent, says, in quoting the comment on
cause (c) found under Sec. -! 79 of the Restatement of
Torts, as follows:
"(f) Antecedent Lack of Preparation.
* * * If the defendant, after discovering plaintiff's peril, does all that can reasonably be
expected of hin1, the fact that his efforts are
defeated by antecedent lack of preparation or a
previous course of negligent conduct is not sufficient to 1nake him liable. All that is required of
him is that he use carefully his then available
ability. Thus if A, a railway engineer discovers
a wayfarer helpless on a highway crossing which
he has entered without taking precautions to see
whether a train was approaching and A, thereafter does all which is then in his power to stop
the train before it hits the traveler, the traveler
may not recover against the railroad although his
position was seen in ample time to stop the train
had the brakes not been negligently permitted to
be in bad condition. So too, if a railroad train is
exceeding the statutory speed limit in approaching a level crossing, but the engineer does not see
the plaintiff's helpless peril on the crossing in
time to stop the train, the fact that the train
could have stopped in the distance bet\veen the
two points had it been going at the lawful speed,
is not enough to Inake the defendant liable to the
negligent plaintiff."
In the case of :l\IINGUS V. OLSEN, 114 Utah 505,
201 Pac. 2d 495, Justice Wolfe in his concurring opinion
says:
"Under the above quoted section (480) sub11
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

di1:ision (a) the defeudanl nwst kuou· of· thf>
decedent's situa.tion, it is not enough that he could
have discovered decedent's situation, had he exerr·ised ordinary vigilance.
"~o un]Pss from the evidence it
r<>asonahl~' found that defendant saw

could be
deeedent
during that time, then under this rule plaintiff's
cannot l'PC'O\'Pr." (Emphasis added)
The court in this case having held that where the
ariver of the automobile failed to see an inattentive
pedestrian who had walked out into the street in front
of the automobile, and the driver having failed to see
the pedestrian until within 10 feet of him, that the driver
of the automobile did not have a last clear chance to
avoid the accident.
Under the evidence of the case, Section 480 of the
Restatement of Torts was not applicable for the reason
that defendant did not know of plaintiff's situation until
it was too late to avoid the collision and defendant,
immediately upon becoming aware ofthe plaintiff's situation, utilized with reasonable care his then existing
a:bility to avoid the collision. There being no claim by
p~~intiff that he, plaintiff was inattentive, and plaintiff
in fact claiming that he had discovered his own peril.
(B) UNDER THE EVIDENCE OF THE CASE THE
TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY REFUSED TO SUBMIT THE
CASE TO THE JURY UPON THE LAST CLEAR CHANCE
DOCTRINE AS SET FORTH IN SECTION 479 OF THE RESTATEMENT OF TORTS.

Section 479 of the Restatement of Torts is as follows:
... _ "A plaintiff who has negligently subjected

12
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hiuuselt to a ri~k of harm frmn the defendant\;
~nhsequent negligence may recover for the harm
caused thereby if, ilnmediately proceeding the
harm,

(a) The plaintiff is unable to avoid it by the exerci~e of reasonable vigilance and care and
(b) The defendant,
(i) I~now~ of the plaintiff's situation and
realizes the helpless peril involved therein; or
(ii) !(now~ of the plaintiff's situation and
has reason to realize the peril involved thereIn, or
(iii) \\~ ould have discovered the plaintiff's
situation and thus had reason to realize the
plaintiff's helpless peril had he exercised the
vigilance which it was his duty to the plaintiff to exercise, and
(c) Thereafter is negligent in failing to utilize
with reasonable care and competence his then
existing ability to avoid harming the plaintiff."
The court in the case of COMPTON V. OGDEN
1TNION RY. & DEPOT CO., Utah, 235 Pac. 2d 515, says:
"That section deals with situations where the
plaintiff is unable to avoid the consequences of his
own negligence or what is often referred to as
~Inextricable peril' and by reason thereof the
defendant alone has the last clear chance to avert
an injury to the plaintiff."
"Where the plaintiff is thus in a position of
inextricable peril the defendant is liable either:
(1) If the defendant knows of the plaintiff's

13
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·situation and realizes or has reason to realize
the helpless peril, or,
( 2) In the case where a duty exists toward the
plain tiff if in the exercise of reasonable vigi-:
lance the defendant should have discovered
the plaintiff's helpless situation in time to
avoid the injury. But this is so only if the
plaintiff's negligence has come to a rest and
plaintiff is, therefore, unable by the exercise
of reasonable vigilance and care to avoid th~
injury.''
In this case the court states that the doctrine of
''inextricable peril" applies to cases where one has negligently caught his foot in a frog on a switch or some other
such circumstance. The court also in this case refers to
the other Utah cases where the doctrine of "inextricable
peril" has been applied, such being; the case of a man
helpless on the track under a moving train, TEAKLE
V. SAN PEDRO RAILWAY CO., 32 Utah 279, 90 Pac.
402; boy asleep on a railroad track KNUTSON V. OREGON SHORT LINE RAILROAD, 79 Utah 145, 2 Pac.
2d 102, and PALMER V. OREGON SHORT LINE
RAILROAD, 34 Utah 466, 98 Pac. 689. S.ee also
GRAHAM V. JOHNSON, 109 Utah 346, 166 P 2d 330.
The doctrine of last. clear chance under this section
does not include cases in which a plaintiff has the physical and mental ability to avoid the risk up to the mome,nt
of harm. His continuing negligence continues to insulate
the defendant's negligence and the ordinary rule of contributory negligence governs .the case. COMPTON V.
OGDEN UNION RY. & DEPOT CO., supra.
14
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Defendant coutends that the plaintiff was not in a
position of "inextricable peril". Plaintiff testified that
when he canw to a stop on the highway, he looked north
and again obseryed plaintiff's truck and at that time the
truck was 125 feet a-way. Plaintiff testified he rmnained
on the tractor while watching the truck approaching, but
still proceeded out onto the highway and did nothing to
get out of the way. Certainly plaintiff had the physical
and mental ability to get out of the way to avoid the harm
to himself. His failing to utilize his physical and mental
ability to avoid the risk of harm was continuing negligence.
Under the court's ruling in prior cases it is defendant's contention that plaintiff under any circumstance
was not in a position of "inextricable peril" as is described in the CO:\£PTON V. OGDEN UNION RY. &
DEPOT CO., case quoted before.
In any event, to invoke the doctrine of last clear
chance, the evidence must clearly show that the defendant had a last clear chance to avoid the accident. This
court held in the case of MOREY V. ROGERS, Utah, 252
Pac. 2d 231, that one should not be liable for failing to
avoid the effect of the others negligence in a situation
whe1e it is speculative as to whether he was afforded a
clear opportunity to avoid it. The court in that case has
further held that for the question to be properly submitted to a jury, the evidence must be such as would
reasonably support the finding that there was a fair and
clear opportunity to avoid the injury. The court further
said:
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"It would . not Le sufficient that it appear
from hindsight that by some possible safety measure, or even by reasonable care the defendant,
"by the skin of his teeth" could have avoided the
collision."
~ehis court further held in the case of SANT V.
MILLEH, 115 Utah 559, 206 Pacific 2nd 719, that a
pedestrian who walked across a main highway and
stopped for 3 to 5 seconds with his back to approaching
traffic was not in "helpless peril" and his negligence was
continuing. The court further in this case held that as
there was no showing that the driver of the car involved
know or has a reasonable chance to discover appellant':-;
position of danger in time to avoid running into him;
that the doctrine of last clear chance did not apply.
This court has further set forth that in order for
the doctrine of last clear chance to .apply the defendant
must have a fair and clear opportunity to avoid injury.
COX Y. THOMPSON, 254 P 2d, 1047; HICKOCK.~V.
SKINNER, 113 Utah 1, 190 Pac. 2d 514. In GRAHAM
Y. JOHNSON, 109 Utah 365, 172 Pac. 2d 665, the court
says,
"Her opportunity to avoid the accident muat
not be a mere possibility, but a clear_ opportunity."

Whether or· not the facts of the case are such that
it-comes within the provisions of Section 479 or 480 of
th~ Restatement of Torts, there must be evidence that
the- defendant, as stated by the court:
"is negligent in failing to utilize with reasonable care and competence his then existing ability
to avoid harming the plaintiff.
.\
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··'dw Lir~t and only negligence which is the
basis of recovery under the clear chance doctrine
is this failure of the defendant to avoid the harm,
having the knowledge and ability to do so."

The defendant \Yilliams did not have any knowledge
of the position of harm of plaintiff Beckstrorn until such
time as he was but 65 feet away from Beckstrmn, or until
plaintiff failed or was unable to stop the tractor and at.
that tirne defendant did not have a clear chance to avoid
the harn1, and he at that time utilized his then existing
ability to attempt to avoid the accident by attempting
to stop.
There is no showing that plaintiff was ever in helpless peril, no showing that defendant knew of plaintiff's
situation in such a time that would afford defendant a
clear chance to avoid the accident, and, therefore, the
doccrine should not apply.
Taking each section of Section 479 of the Restatement of Torts, defendant contends:
(a) That plaintiff was able to avoid the harm to
himself by the exercise of reasonable vigilance and care, not being in an 'inextricable
peril', and having the physical and n1ental
ability to have removed himself from the path
of the oncoming truck of defendant.
(b) The defendant,
(i) Did not know the plaintiff's situation
until it was too late to avoid the collision, and
had not the opportunity to realize the help·
less peril, if any, involved.
(ii) Did not know of plaintiff's situation and
had no reason to realize the peril involved
therein, or
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(iii) 'rhe plaintiff

wa::~

not in helpless peril.

Under the provisions of Section 479, the court was
correct in refusing to submit the case to the jury upon
the theory of last clear chance as set forth in the section.
POINT

r_rwo

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN FAILING AND
REFUSING TO GIVE PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTION 11, THE COURT HAVING GIVEN SUBSTANTIALLY
THE REQUESTED INSTRUCTION IN ITS INSTRUCTIONS
3, 4 AND 12.

Plaintiff's requested instruction Nn. 11 was:
"The duty imposed upon the plaintiff in moving his tractor out of the yard and driveway and
onto the highway was to exercise that degree of
care which an ordinarily prudent person would
exercise under similar circumstances. If he did
exercise such care, then there would be no negligence on his part in connection therewith."
The court gave Instructions No. 3, 4 anti 12, as
follows:
INSTRUCTION NO. 3.
"You are instructed that negligence is the
failure to use ordinary and reasonable care in the
management of one's property or person. It is
the failure to do what an ordinary and reasonable
person would have done under the circumstances,
or the doing what such person would not have
done. The fault may lie in acting or in omitting
to act."
INSTRUCTION NO. 4.
"Ordinary care is that care which persons of
ordinary prudence would exercise in the management of their own affairs in order to avoid injury
to themselves or to others."
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iNS'rRUCTION NO. 12.
''You are instructed that a driver about to
enter a highway from a private road or driveway
:shall yield the right of way to vehicles approaching on said highway, and such driver must use
reasonable and ordinary care to avoid a collision
with a vehicle proceeding on said highway."
Instruction No. 12 is not claimed by plaintiff to be
erroneous and the instruction, in addition to instructing
regarding the duty of an operator of vehicle entering a
highway from a private roadway, instructed that the
driver was obligated to use reasonable and ordinary care
to avoid a collision with a vehicle proceeding on a highway. In Instruction No. 3, the court instructed the jury
as to what negligence was and in Instruction No. 4 the
jury was instructed as to the definition of ordinary care.
Instructi~ns 3 and 4 substantially incorporate plaintiff's
Instruc( :>n No. 11 and all the instructions taken together
fairly iri~tructed the jury with no overburden in favor
of either plaintiff or defendant. The movement of a
vehicle from a private road or drive~ay onto a highway
is a matter which is regulated by statute, 57-7-139, Utah
Code Annotated, 1943, as amended, the code provision
applicable at the time of the collision, provided as
follows:
"The driver of a vehicle about to enter or
cross a highway from a private road or driveway
shall yield the right-of-way to all vehicles
approaching on said highway."
The court was obligated and did instruct the jury
concerning plaintiff's duty in driving onto the highway
19
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from a private road o~ driveway, and in the Instruction
No. 12, which instruction covered the statutory duty, the
court was careful to instruct that the driver had the
obligation of taking reasonable and ordinar~ care to
avoid a collision with a vehicle proceeding along the
highway.
There was no error on the part of the court in failing
to give plaintiff's requested Instruction No. 11, the substance of the instruction having been given by the court
in the instructions as a whole.
POINT THREE
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY SUSTAINED DEFENDANT'S OBJECTION TO PLAINTIFF'S QUESTION TO
THE WITNESS TANNER TO STATE WHAT PLAINTIFF
TOLD TANNER IN THE PAYSON HOSPITAL AS TO HOW
THE ACCIDENT OCCURRED, SUCH QUESTION CALLING
FOR A SELF SERVING STATEMENT MADE BY PLAINTIFF AND BEING HEARSAY EVIDENCE AS TO THE
FACTS OF THE OCCURRENCE OF THE ACCIDENT.

Officer Beardall, the investigating highway patrolman, in the course of his investigation questioned the
plaintiff at the Payson Hospital and at the hospital the
plaintiff told Officer Beardall that he never did see
plaintiff's truck prior to the collision and was looking
back to the west at the time of the collision (R. 122, 123).
This admission, by plaintiff, was part of defendant's case
in chief, introduced as primary evidence of the facts
stated to Officer Beardall and as substantive evidence
in the defendant's case. The admission to Officer
Beardall was not introduced by defendant to impeach
plaintiff or to attack his credibility, but rather was part
20
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of defendant'~ pri1nary l'videnee of the furt that plaintiff Heek~trom never did see the truck of defendant and
Beek~tron1 "·as looking to the back as he drove the tractor
out onto the highway.
rrhe Court correctly sustained the defendant's objection to the question put to the witness Tanner to state
what the plaintiff Beckstrom told him at the Payson
Hospital concerning the manner in which the collision
occurred. As to what Beckstron1 told Tanner at the hospital was self-serving and if the question as to what was
said \Yere asked to get out the facts of the accident,
clearly hearsay (R. 181).
Plaintiff has cited to the court several Utah cases
which are contended to be in support of the plaintiff's
position, the cases, however, are contra to plaintiff's
position, and as a fact, the holding of such cases is that
in support of the Court's ruling in sustaining the objection to the witness Tanner concerning what plaintiff told
Tanner at the hospital regarding the accident.
In the case of PETERSON V. RICHARDS, 73 Utah
59, 272 Pac. 229, the Court discusses the difference in the
rule as to prior consonant statements as between a 1nere
witness and a party to the action. The Court in the
quoted case also discusses the other Utah cases which
have been quoted by plaintiff in support of his position,
and which case actually are against the position of plaintiff. In the quoted case the Court says:
" . . . . all admissions of a litigant as to a
material fact are adduced and received, for the
purpose of establishing the truth of the state-
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ments made or the existence of a fact to which
they relate, and on the theory that what a party,
as to a matter of fact, has voluntarily admitted to
be true, may be reasonably be taken as true,
especially as to matter adverse to him, for presumptively a party ordinarily does not admit as
true that which is against him unless it is true.
And of such probative effect are admissions of
matters of fact of a party generally regarded
when adverse or disserving and voluntarily made
as to make a prima facie case to the extent of the
subject matter of the admission, and to dispense
with other proof of the fact so admitted and is
sufficient to support a finding of fact resting
along upon such extrajudicial admission of a
party. 3 Jones, Comms. on Evidence, Par. 1072.
Thus, evidence of adn1issions of a party adduced
by his adversary in his case in chief, and as a
part of it, is received as substantive evidence, as
primary evidence of the fact admitted, and not
merely to impeach or discredit the testimony
denies the admission, such but raises a conflict
in the evidence as to whether the admission was or
was not made. But in such case it may not be said
that the party against whom evidence of his
admission was received was impeached or discredited because he hy his testimony denied making the admission. To say the contrary is to say
that mere conflicts of evidence or testimony constitute impeachments of the respective witnesses.
In such respect admissions of a party stand on a
smnewhat different basis than mere inconsistent
extrajudicial and prior statements, for admissions
of a party are received as substantive or primary
evidence of the fact declared, while inconsistent
statement are received only as affecting the
credibility of a witness and the weight of his testi22
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1nony, and not a~ (_'\·ide~l('e of the fact declared by
the inconsistent state1nent."
Plaintiff made no offer to prove what was said to
the witness Tanner and the record is void as to what it
is clain1ed Tanner would have said; therefore, the question as to error in sustaining the objection to the statement and question is moot, there being no way to know
what Tanner would have said.
~\fter Officer Beardall testified concerning plaintiff's statement to him, plaintiff was again called to the
stand and was able to testify concerning the conversation
with Beardall and to deny that he made the statement
attributed to hi1n by Officer Beardall.
Respondent submits that the court committed no
prejudical error in sustaining the objection to the question put to the witness Tanner.

CONCLUSION
Respondent respectfully submits that there was no
prejudicial error in the trial of the action, that the jury
verdict was just and fair and should be sustained by
court.
Respectfully submitted,

STEWAR~r, CANNON & HANSON,
Attorneys for Defendant and
Respondent.
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